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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION

DEFINITION

AB

Appellee’s Brief

Act

The Federal Election Campaign Act

AOB

Appellants’ Original Brief

The Commission

Federal Election Commission

JA

Joint Appendix

The Leadership Fund

Stop This Insanity, Inc. Employee
Leadership Fund

MCFL

FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986)

NCPAC

FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 494
(1985)

NRWC

Nat’l Right to Work Comm.v. FEC, 459
U.S. 197 (1982)

PAC

Political Action Committee

SSF

Separate Segregated Fund

STI

Stop This Insanity, Inc.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Commission spends much of its brief making a full-throated
endorsement of disclosure requirements even though no disclosure requirements
are challenged here. Between the Commission’s focus on unchallenged disclosure
requirements and its attempt to refocus the case on the Leadership Fund’s
sponsoring organization, rather than the Leadership Fund itself, in its
“Counterstatement of the Issue Presented,” the Commission establishes that it has
missed what this case is about.
This case is primarily about the Leadership Fund—an independent legal
entity—and its right to speak. The Commission does not dispute that the
Leadership Fund is a separate entity with its own speech rights, yet it ignores the
myriad arguments and substantive discussion the Leadership Fund provided in the
opening brief on the real issue presented here: whether the Leadership Fund has a
constitutional right to solicit and accept contributions from members of the general
public so long as they are kept in a non-contribution account. As secondary
matters, the case also implicitly addresses the rights of potential contributors and
sponsoring organizations to associate and speak by providing funds to the
Leadership Fund.
With respect to the Leadership Fund’s right to speak, the appellants
established in the opening brief that the Supreme Court has recognized only one
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governmental interest in restricting political speech—the anti-corruption interest.
The appellants further established that the anti-corruption interest does not apply
here. The Commission apparently agrees, as it does not claim that the anticorruption interest supports the government’s speech restrictions as applied to the
Leadership Fund. Additionally, the Commission has abandoned the other flawed
interests asserted by the district court.
Rather than defend the district court’s ruling, the Commission asks this
Court to adopt a new interest for restricting political speech—the disclosure
interest. But it offers no reason why this Court should vastly expand this
government interest in compelling speech (by requiring disclosure) so that it can
give the government the power to muzzle speakers simply by failing to require
disclosure. There is none. If Congress wishes separate segregated funds (“SSFs”)
to disclose contributors, sponsorship funds, or any other aspect of an SSF’s
existence, the Commission’s arguments here can be appropriately raised. But in
this case, arguments over the value of disclosure requirements amount to nothing
more than a straw man.
The Court should not be distracted by the vigor of the Commission’s defense
of disclosure requirements. No disclosure requirements are at issue here. And in
light of the fact that the Commission has no response to the arguments raised in the
opening brief, the district court’s decision should be reversed.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE LEADERSHIP FUND HAS INDEPENDENT FIRST
AMENDMENT SPEECH RIGHTS.
The Leadership Fund is organized as a separate segregated fund and

therefore has independent First Amendment rights. Yet the Commission’s entire
argument is dependent upon re-directing the Court’s focus to the rights of Stop
This Insanity, Inc. (“STI”) and ignoring that this case is primarily brought by the
Leadership Fund. It is the Leadership Fund whose rights are most trampled by the
Federal Election Campaign Act (the “Act”) prohibiting the Leadership Fund from
opening a non-contribution account and soliciting and receiving contributions from
the general public.
STI and the Leadership Fund are separate legal entities, and the Commission
admits as much. AB 28. Thus, each possesses an independent right to speak
regardless of the Leadership Fund’s role as a connected political action committee
(“PAC”), for which it receives both specific benefits and specific burdens.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010). That the Leadership Fund is
organized as an SSF does not justify depriving it of the same robust First
Amendment speech and associational rights that protect the full-throated political
speech of other PACs, individuals, labor unions, corporations, and non-profits.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that its “foundational First Amendment
cases” are grounded in the recognition that “citizens must be able to discuss issues,
-3-

great or small, through the means of expression they deem best suited to their
purpose.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 781 (2000). Indeed, the Supreme Court
has expressly rejected the notion that a PAC’s “form of organization or method of
solicitation diminishes [its] entitlement to First Amendment protection.” FEC v.
Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm. (“NCPAC”), 470 U.S. 480, 494 (1985).
The Leadership Fund fully addressed this point over 10 pages of the AOB. AOB
18-27. The Commission did not argue that SSFs do not have free speech rights
simply by virtue of the fact that they are connected organizations, nor could it.
Rather, the Commission strives to misdirect the analysis toward STI and
away from the independent rights of the Leadership Fund. But in Citizens United,
the Supreme Court expressly recognized that an SSF is a separate association,
distinct from its connected corporation. 558 U.S. at 337. Accordingly, the fact
that an SSF could engage in some speech did not cure the constitutional maladies
in banning its connected corporation’s speech. Id. Nor is the inverse true—that
because a corporation’s speech is not banned, a connected SSF’s may be silenced.
Moreover, it is irrelevant that the sponsoring organization establishes the
SSF. AB 27. Once established, the SSF is its own entity. An SSF cannot choose
to organize itself, AB 26, but neither can any other organization. The key point is
that, once organized, an SSF exists separate and apart from its sponsoring
organization, and it exists as a collection of people who wish to speak. Thus, it
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does not follow that “no SSF can ever exist apart from the [sponsoring
organization’s] desire to engage in [political] spending.” AB 27.
The Commission’s theory could have dangerous, wide-ranging implications.
Under its reasoning, the government can restrict the speech of wholly-owned
subsidiaries of corporations because they do not exist separately from the control
of the company that owns them. No PAC exists separately from the desire of its
contributors to speak. Allowing restrictions on speech based on the ability of those
forming the organization to speak cannot be a proper application of the First
Amendment.
Therefore, it is irrelevant whether STI chooses to speak, how much it
chooses to speak, or why it chooses to speak or not speak.1 STI is a separate
organization, and its ability to speak is no more justification for restricting the

1

The Commission asserts that if the only issue here is the Leadership Fund’s
independent activity, then STI would “seem to lack” a redressable injury-in-fact
and would have no Article III standing. AB 28. That is beside the point of
whether the Leadership Fund is an independent entity with its own speech rights.
See Americans for Safe Access v. DEA, 706 F.3d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(holding that “to proceed to the merits of [Appellants’] claims, we need only find
one party with standing”). In any event, the Commission has not moved to dismiss
STI, nor would such a motion have merit. Just as Glengary LLC and the individual
appellants have constitutional interests in contributing to the Leadership Fund so
that their voices may be heard, so does STI. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349
(“Political speech does not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its
source is a corporation.’”) (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784).
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Leadership Fund’s speech as does the right to speak of any other company, person,
or organization.
II.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO INTEREST IN RESTRICTING THE
LEADERSHIP FUND’S SPEECH.
A.

Strict Scrutiny Applies to the Contribution, Source, and
Solicitation Restrictions.

The source and solicitation restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. The
Commission argues that limitations on the amount of contributions are subject to
intermediate scrutiny, citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) and relying most
heavily on McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). AB 34-36. The Commission
ignores that this case is about (1) whether certain people may contribute at all, and
(2) whether the Leadership Fund may solicit contributions from the general public,
which necessarily conveys political speech. These restrictions are far more
burdensome and thus command a higher level of scrutiny
In McConnell, the Supreme Court explained that limitations on the amount
an individual may contribute are subject to intermediate scrutiny because
“contribution limits ‘leave the contributor free to become a member of any
political association and to assist personally in the association’s efforts on behalf of
candidates,’ and allow associations ‘to aggregate large sums of money to promote
effective advocacy.’” 540 U.S. at 136 (citations omitted). The Court further stated
that “[t]he ‘overall effect’ of dollar limits on contributions is ‘merely to require
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candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of
persons.’” Id.
The reason the Court ruled a lower level of scrutiny was appropriate in
McConnell is undermined by the source restrictions here. SSFs cannot raise funds
from a greater number of persons because all but a narrowly defined class are
prohibited from contributing. And the solicitation restrictions directly prohibit
core political speech, AOB 42, which is not the case with respect to limits on the
amount a person can contribute to a party or candidate.
The Commission only makes a passing argument against the appellants’
analysis in the opening brief, stating that none of the authorities cited specifically
referred to SSFs. AB 37. That is, of course, irrelevant. The Commission makes
no effort to explain why SSFs (and their potential contributors ) receive a lower
level of scrutiny over restrictions on their speech. As is explained above, infra, §
I., there is no reason to differentiate among organizational forms to determine the
weight of their free speech rights.
Regardless, the Court need not resolve the level of scrutiny applicable here.
Under any level of analysis, the source and solicitation restrictions as applied to the
Leadership Fund are unconstitutional.
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B.

The Government Has No Interest In Restricting The Leadership
Fund’s Non-Contribution Speech Or Contributions Thereto.

Free speech analysis requires weighing the burden on speech against the
asserted governmental interest. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 692
(D.C. Cir. 2010). The burden here is obvious: the Leadership Fund’s ability to
speak is limited by restrictions on accepting funds for non-contribution
expenditures, 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(C) and 441a(a)(3); source prohibitions, §
4441b(a); and solicitation restrictions, § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i). See, § II.D., post. And
there is no countervailing interest. The Commission has correctly abandoned all of
the district court’s reasoning as to the government’s interests in restricting the
Leadership Fund’s speech. It has correctly abandoned the invalid anti-distortion
interest; it has correctly abandoned the invalid equalization interest, and most
importantly, it has correctly abandoned the inapplicable anti-corruption interest.
In the opening brief, the appellants noted that “[i]n the context of restricting
political speech in connection with campaign financing, the Supreme Court has
only recognized one interest that may outweigh the First Amendment interests:
preventing quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of such corruption.” AOB
28 (citing SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 692). The Commission does not refute that.
Citizens United, EMILY’s List v. FEC , 581 F.3d 1(2009), and SpeechNow are
based on the principle that non-contribution expenditures do not give rise to actual
or apparent quid pro quo corruption and therefore may not constitutionally be
-8-

limited or proscribed. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356; see also Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 25. Accordingly, this case does not implicate the anti-corruption interest.
The Commission has no response. The Commission’s reasoning—relying
on EMILY’s List footnote 7—that EMILY’s List is inapplicable because the Court
“repeatedly emphasized that its ‘constitutional analysis of non-profits applies only
to non-connected non-profits’ . . . while explicitly disclaiming to address the
constitutionality of FECA as applied to SSFs.” AB 47 (citing EMILY’s List, 581
F.3d at 8 n.7), is disingenuous. In the Commission’s notice that it was deleting
various regulations in response to EMILY’s List, the Commission expressly
adopted a commentator’s argument that footnote 7 “was simply a description of
how the term ‘non-profit entities’ was to be used in the opinion because the term
‘non-profit entities’ does not appear in the Act.” Explanation and Justification for
Final Rules on Funds Received in Response to Solicitations, 75 Fed. Reg. 13223,
13224 (Mar. 19, 2010). In the Commission’s own words: “Although the court
defined the term non-profit entities as not including SSFs, the court explicitly
ordered the District Court to ‘vacate the challenged regulations,’ referring to [the
regulations] in their entirety. The court provides no exception for SSFs.” Id.
The Commission’s attempt to distinguish SpeechNow and EMILY’s List by
noting that they do not address disclosure requirements, AB 49, also fails. It is part
of the Commission’s overall attempt to recast the issue in this case as one of a
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“constitutional right to conceal such political spending.” AB 39. That claim
suffers from two faulty premises. The first is that this case involves a challenge to
disclosure requirements. There is no such challenge here. The second is that it is
constitutionally permissible to restrict speech because courts have found it
constitutionally permissible to compel speech based on the disclosure interest.
That is not so, and the Commission does not identify a single case in which the
Supreme Court has ruled that a disclosure interest justifies restrictions on speech
rather than an area where Congress may require disclosure. See e.g., AB 42-43
(stating that eight Justices in Citizens United agreed that the Act’s disclosure
requirements were “constitutionally permissible”) (emphasis added).
In Citizens Against Rent Control, the Court noted that an ordinance limiting
contributions to PACs formed to support or oppose ballot measures submitted to
the public placed an “impermissible restraint” on freedom of association and “the
freedom of expression of groups and those individuals who wish to express their
views through committees.” Id. at 299. The Court rejected disclosure as an
interest justifying the restraint, holding that “[t]he integrity of the political system
will be adequately protected if contributors are identified in a public filing
revealing the amounts contributed; if it is thought wise, legislation can outlaw
anonymous contributions.” Id. at 299-300. Accordingly, because there was “no
significant state or public interest in curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot
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measure,” the “limits on contributions which in turn limit[ed] expenditures plainly
impair[ed] freedom of expression” and were struck down. Id.
It is a bedrock constitutional principle that the government cannot condition
a benefit on the surrender of First Amendment rights. See Pickering v. Board of
Educ. Twp. High School, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (rejecting that “teachers may
constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would
otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection
with the operation of the public schools in which they work”); Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (holding that because a tax exemption is a “privilege” or
“bounty” does not preclude its denial from constituting an impermissible
infringement of speech). But that is exactly what the Commission seeks to do.
Congress has not yet changed disclosure requirements for SSFs in light of Citizens
United. But such Congressional inaction cannot justify the continued
unconstitutional suppression the Leadership Fund ’s independent speech. In such a
scenario, the statutory “tail” wags the First Amendment “dog.”
Under the Commission’s theory, the government could simply undo Citizens
United and restrict the speech of corporations, labor unions, non-connected PACs
and non-profit entities simply by granting disclosure exemptions. The appellants
made this point in the opening brief, AOB 50, and the Commission has not
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articulated any limiting principle in response. There is none under the
Commission’s reasoning.
In sum, the Commission cannot unconstitutionally enforce a statute because
its constitutionally permissible application creates an “anomalous effect” Congress
would not have contemplated before part of the statute was found unconstitutional.
If Congress wants to ensure that contributions are disclosed to the public,
Congress’ only potentially constitutional remedy is to amend the exemption it
created and foster more public disclosure of corporate solicitations for SSFs.
C.

The Solicitation Prohibition Does Not Further An Anti-Coercion
Interest and the Leadership Fund’s Plan of Action Nonetheless
Addresses Such Concerns.

The appellants established that the anti-coercion interest is not served by
prohibiting the Leadership Fund from making targeted solicitations to people who
are not part of the restricted class or by making generalized solicitations, like radio
and television ads. AOB 46-52. The Commission’s responses are inapposite and
confused. For instance, the Commission responds to the point that other
regulations prohibit coercion by stating that the Leadership Fund has not “pledged
to abide by these restrictions.” AB 54. Of course the Leadership Fund would
abide by the restrictions. They are law. And if the Leadership Fund did not abide
by the provisions, the Commission could enforce them.
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Similarly, without support, the Commission claims that Congress has
determined that solicitations to employees “are inherently coercive.” AB 52. But
the Leadership Fund does not challenge limitations on how often it can solicit
employees. In any event, if Congress had determined such solicitations were
inherently coercive, it would not have allowed them. Yet it specifically allowed
direct solicitations to the employees. Given the fact that some direct solicitations
to the restricted class are not too coercive for Congress, it only stands to reason
that direct solicitations to others that the restricted class will not be privy to and
general solicitations on radio and television that restricted class members might
overhear are not unduly coercive because they are not directed in any meaningful
way at the employees as apart from the general public. 2

2

The Commission’s argument that the ability to solicit unlimited amounts for noncontribution expenditures twice yearly will “coerce” employees, AB 53, while
soliciting up to $5,000 from employees twice yearly is not coercive, ignores the
historical context in which the $5,000 limit was passed. The median household
income in the United States is currently $46,326. See How Much Does the
Average American Make?, available at http://www.mybudget360.com/how-muchdoes-the-averageamerican-make-breaking-down-the-us-household-incomenumbers/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2012). In the year Congress passed these
restrictions and exemptions, the year 1976, the median household income was
$10,962 in nominal terms. Dave Manual, Median Household Income in the United
States, available at http://www.davemanuel.com/median-household-income.php
(last visited Aug. 22, 2012). And yet, in 1976, the nominal contribution limit was
nearly half that median household income: $5,000. That means Congress allowed
a corporation to solicit a maximum contribution of 45.6% of an average
employee’s median household income, twice per year. These data demonstrate that
Continued on following page
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Indeed, the superficial nature of the Commission’s concern that the
Leadership Fund’s proposed non-contribution expenditure solicitations to the
general public could coerce the employees of its connected organization, AB50-53,
is revealed by the Commission’s Club for Growth Advisory Opinion. See FEC
Advisory Op. 2010-09, (Club for Growth), 2010 WL 3184267, at *3 (July 22,
2010) (“Club for Growth AO”). In the Club for Growth AO, the Commission
agreed that the corporation, Club for Growth, Inc. (the “Club”) could establish an
independent expenditure-only PAC (the “Club PAC”) that could solicit and accept
contributions from the general public even if the Club paid for the PAC’s
establishment, administrative, and solicitation expenses. Id. It did not express a
coercion concern. Indeed, the Commission argues here that STI can engage in the
same speech and solicitations the Leadership Fund requests through a super PAC.
AB 32, 42. So, clearly, no anti-coercion interest is served under the Commission’s
view. Similarly, the Commission fails to justify its concern over coercion of
suppliers, AB 54, in light of the fact that a corporation can solicit suppliers through
other forms of PACs by the Commission’s own admission, AB 32.

Continued from previous page
it is not the quantitative contribution limits that prevent coercion—otherwise
Congress would have chosen a lower amount.
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Accordingly, the Commission can point to no interests sufficient to justify
prohibiting the Leadership Fund from soliciting the general public for noncontribution expenditures. See U.S. v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agr.
Implement Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567, 595 (1957) (“It is startling to learn that a
union spokesman or the spokesman for a corporate interest has fewer constitutional
rights when he talks to the public than when he talks to members of his group.”)
D.

The Act, As Applied Here, Burdens Speech.

The Leadership Fund’s ability to speak is limited by restrictions on
accepting funds for non-contribution expenditures, 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(C) and
441a(a)(3); source prohibitions, § 4441b(a); and solicitation restrictions, §
441b(b)(4)(A)(i). And any burden on speech is unconstitutional when the
government has no interest in restricting the speech. AOB 27-31, 32-40, 43-45;
see also SpeechNow, 559 F.3d at 695 (“All that matters is that the First
Amendment cannot be encroached upon for naught” and noting that where the
government has no interest, “something outweighs nothing every time.”)
(quotations and marks omitted). That the Leadership Fund can, at significant
burden, clone itself and form another organization does not eliminate the burden on
speech. AOB 24-26; see also Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 708 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“That the avenue left open is
more burdensome than the one foreclosed is ‘sufficient to characterize [a
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regulatory interpretation] as an infringement on First Amendment activities.’”)
(quoting FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 255 (1986)
(“MCFL”)). And the Commission does not argue otherwise.
In a footnote, the Commission takes issue with the Leadership Fund’s
argument that being limited to a small restricted class severely limits the amount of
money it can raise. AB30 n.9. Oddly, it relies on cases stating that there is no
equalization interest for supporting government restrictions on speech. E.g. Davis
v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738 (2008). The Leadership Fund is not asking the
government to restrict anyone’s speech to equalize speaking ability, and so the
Commission’s argument fails.
The Commission primarily claims that STI is not burdened here because it
could form another PAC. AB 29-33. As an initial matter, the fact that STI can
form another PAC is irrelevant to whether the Leadership Fund is burdened by
speech restrictions. See § I., infra. Second, assuming STI is “able to operate a
super PAC,” that does not mean it would not be burdensome for STI to form and
operate one. The additional requirements in creating a second PAC “may create a
disincentive for [plaintiffs] to engage in political speech. Detailed record-keeping
and disclosure obligations, along with the duty to appoint a treasurer and custodian
of the records, impose administrative costs that many small entities may be unable
to bear.” MCFL, 479 U.S. at 254-55.
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III.

THE LEADERSHIP FUND DID NOT WAIVE ITS SECTION 441b(a)
CHALLENGE.
The Commission does not refute any of the Leadership Fund’s argument

establishing that it did not waive its challenge to Section 441b(a). In a footnote,
the Commission only states that “the complaint in this case does not clearly
articulate the nature of any challenge” regarding section 441b(a), which prohibits
SSFs from accepting, inter alia, contributions from corporations. AB 56 n.22.
The Commission does not cite any law for its proffered “clear articulation”
standard, and does not even suggest that the Commission failed to meet Rule 8’s
notice pleading requirement. The Complaint provides proper notice of the
challenge to Section 441b(a) as applied, and the issue was fully litigated below.
AOB 52-54. Thus, it is not waived. Additionally, the parties agree that no
separate argument is necessary to address the challenge to Section 441b(a) because
the standards by which all of the other challenged sections are judged apply
equally to Section 441b(a) here. AOB 54; AB 56 n.22.
IV.

APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
The factors weighed in determining whether injunctive relief is appropriate

all favor the appellants here.3 AOB 55-58. In response to the significant burdens

3

The appellants agree that if the request for injunctive relief would be moot if the
district court’s dismissal of the action were affirmed.
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on the Leadership Fund’s speech created by the statutes and regulations at issue
here, the Commission once again claims that there is no burden on STI. For the
reasons stated above, the burden on STI exists but is not the primary burden here.
The Leadership Fund’s ability to speak is restricted. Moreover, appellants
Glengary, LLC, Todd Cefretti, and Ladd Ehlinger—whom the Commission
ignores—continue to be harmed by being prevented from making contributions to
the Leadership Fund. And as stated in the opening brief and not refuted by the
Commission, “‘[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods
of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” AOB 56 (quoting Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)).
Additionally, the balance of hardships and public interest weigh in favor of
injunctive relief. The Supreme Court has made clear that in any conflict between
First Amendment rights and regulation, courts “must give the benefit of any doubt
to protecting rather stifling speech,” and that “the tie goes to the speaker, not the
censor.” FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469, 474 (2007).
There is no tie here, though. The Commission only asserts a hardship insofar as it
must require disclosure and prevent coercion. But even if the injunction is entered,
the Leadership Fund must and will comply with all disclosure requirements
applicable to SSFs and all restrictions on directly soliciting the restricted class. If
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the Leadership Fund did not do so, the Commission would be within its rights to
enforce those provisions just as it always has been permitted to do.
Moreover, an injunction is in the public interest. The Supreme Court “has
long viewed the First Amendment as protecting a marketplace for the clash of
differing views and conflicting ideas. That concept has been stated and restated
almost since the Constitution was drafted.” Citizens Against Rent Control, 454
U.S. at 295. “Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means
to hold officials accountable to the people. The right of citizens to inquire, to hear,
to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to
enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.” Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 339.
Indeed, the First Amendment reflects our “profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen.” N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). In sum, appellants ’
activities are at the core of the First Amendment. The Leadership Fund, as an SSF,
must be permitted to make non-contribution expenditures out of unlimited
corporate, union, or individual funds, even though it maintains a separate bank
account that contributes to candidates from amount- and source-restricted funds.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Leadership Fund and other appellants
respectably request that this Court reverse the district court’s order dismissing this
case and denying a preliminary injunction, and direct that the district court enter a
preliminary injunction enjoining the contribution limits contained in 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a)(1)(C) and 441a(a)(3), the source prohibitions at § 441b(a), the
solicitation restrictions at § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i) and all related regulations as applied
to the appellants.
/s/ Tillman J. Breckenridge
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